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Abstract: This study examined whether oil dependence affected democracy quality 
by referring to provincial-level data in Indonesia. While physical quantity 
production was used to measure oil dependence, democracy was measured based 
on the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI). Static panel data analysis was employed 
to control unobserved time-invariant characteristics of each province, including a 
robust Driscoll and Kraay (D-K) standard error model for the general forms of cross-
sectional dependence when dealing with panel observation. The results showed 
that oil-dependent provinces tended not to have weak democratic qualities. The 
effects were also robust when democracy was separated into three main elements 
of the IDI: political rights, civil liberties, and democratic institutions, or when an 
alternative measure of dependency was used. Interestingly, this study found that 
oil dependence had a stronger effect on democracy in provinces with a lack of oil 
than in Sumatra and Kalimantan, globally known as dominant resource locations. 
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Introduction 
Oil impact has long been understood to penetrate a country’s economy 
substantially. Regardless of whether oil extraction activities may hinder or 
help the nation’s welfare, attention has now moved to examine whether a 
country’s oil dependence has a strong link with democratic progress. This 
issue initially emerged in countries primarily located in the Middle East and 
North Africa, where oil wealth was seen as a factor that stimulated 
authoritarianism (Anderson, 1987; Anderson, 1995). A study by Ross (2001) 
formally hypothesized a relationship focusing on a country’s dependence 
on the oil sector. Ross (2001) found that oil-reliant nations, including 
minerals, tended to have lower quality in democracy. Therefore, this paper 
tested the proposed hypothesis by selecting Indonesia, a developing and 
young democratic country, as a special case study. 
There are two reasons why Indonesia should be particularly considered. 
First, Indonesia’s economy historically stems from oil-based income 
contributions. Oil production was carried out commercially in the 1970s 
following the successful oil reserves discovery in several Sumatra and  
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Kalimantan Islands locations, which later became the forerunners of Indonesia’s giant oil 
fields.1 The contribution of oil production to national income is still crucial to this day, 
although oil production experienced a gradual decrease over time. It has been proven 
that the oil reserves may last approximately more than 50 years as efforts to invest in 
deep-water explorations have been highly devoted.2 
 
Secondly, Indonesia adhered to a democratic system across national and regional 
(provinces and districts) areas for almost two decades. Direct presidential election initially 
started in 2004 and was rapidly echoed by the direct election of regional heads in local 
government in 2005. These events were triggered by the decentralization policy that 
allowed local governments to execute development planning, budgeting, and providing 
public service to local citizens. Although the democratic climate seems to blossom, no 
data were available to monitor development progress on this aspect, making it hard to 
associate the effects of whether oil wealth improves the practicality of democracy in a 
decentralized area. Only since 2009, the Indonesian Democracy Index (IDI) has been 
officially released annually, enabling researchers to verify the progress of local democracy 
across provinces. 
 
The available timeframe of these exogenous events allows testing the extent to which 
democratic progress is affected by activities associated with hydrocarbon resources. As 
oil resources are randomly distributed across Indonesia’s provinces (each province has 
several districts), some regions with oil wealth have become dependent on resource-
based economic sectors. Meanwhile, regions that have less or no oil reserves will rely on 
sectors unrelated to non-renewable resources.  
 
Following Ross’s (2001) study and foreshadowing it to Indonesia’s decentralization 
movement, this research examined whether oil affects democracy and oil-dependent 
oversight produced a devastating effect on democracy at the provincial level. As the study 
using within-country analysis on this field is still lacking, this paper contributes to the 
literature by providing empirical investigations.  
 
Moreover, oil is often seen as a valuable resource capital that should, by default, help to 
improve a country’s economy or achieve better development progress. The positive effect 
of oil on national income has been found in several cross-country studies, for example, 
Alexeev and Conrad (2011), Brunnschweiler (2008), Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), and 
Libman (2013). Despite the blessing consequence that natural resources can contribute, 
researchers have found that countries that depended highly on the mining sector, in 
general, were more likely to have lower development income and outcomes (Sachs & 
Warner, 2001; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004).  
 
Another striking finding of the detrimental effect of oil is that oil wealth retards a 
country’s democracy quality. A seminal article published by Ross (2001) initially provided 
 
1 Indonesia is an archipelago country with more than 17,000 islands in total. The six major islands, however, 
are Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and East Regions, and Papua. 
2 Annual Report of Indonesian Oil and Gas, 2018. Available from 
https://migas.esdm.go.id/uploads/uploads/files/laporan-tahunan/Laptah-Migas-2018---FINAL.pdf 
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empirical evidence as to why oil is bad for democratic development. Ross (2001) utilizing 
country-level data, measured democracy level using a scale ranging from 0 to 10, with the 
highest value indicating the most democratic country.3 Oil dependence was employed as 
the key variable, measured as the share of the aggregate export-value of mining-based 
fuels (petroleum, gas, and coal) in total GDP. Focusing on the period between 1971 and 
1977, with a pooled OLS using a cross-sectional data set, Ross (2001) found that increased 
oil dependence, including minerals, tended to worsen democracy quality. 
 
One might argue that cross-country investigations could be biased due to different 
development levels between developed and developing countries or between Africa-
Middle East versus non-Africa-Middle East countries. Ross (2001) also addressed this 
possibility by controlling the locational effects of countries in the Middle East and sub-
Saharan Africa or distinguishing them according to the country size (i.e., large and small 
states), both using binary variables. Again, the point estimates for oil and minerals were 
still significantly negative, although they had been reduced when additional control 
variables were included. 
 
Referring to why oil hinders democracy in an oil-rich country, Ross (2001) argued that 
rentier and repression effects had weakened the process towards better civil freedom 
and political rights. For example, a higher mineral revenues proportion causes the 
government to build their internal security, enabling them to reduce or block people’s 
demands for democracy. This reason refers to the repression effect. The second case is 
caused by the rentier effect. In oil-wealthy states, the dominant revenues come from oil 
extraction rather than citizens’ taxation. It provides an incentive for the country’s 
residents to put in less effort in paying taxes. As a result, citizens’ demands on the 
government are reduced, making the government less dependent on its citizens, 
weakening checks and balances processes between the two actors, yet deteriorating 
democracy. 
 
Some studies that support Ross’s (2001) paper are Jensen and Wanthecekon (2004), 
Aslaksen (2010), and Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2014). For example, Jensen and 
Wanthecekon (2004) focused on 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa after the 1960-1995 
period. The authors utilized political regime as a proxy for democracy as Ross (2001) did 
with some scale modifications. Using fixed-effects analysis, they found that oil and 
mineral exports, as a share of merchandise exports, negatively impacted democracy in 
Africa, even after controlling dummies for the historical colony.  
 
Aslaksen (2010) regressed democracy on the share of oil in total GDP using pooled cross-
sectional OLS regression and found that oil share harmed political rights. The negative 
impact persisted in whether democracy infrequently regressed, whether per capita 
income, population, and education were included, or whether the fixed-effects and 
dynamic panel model were also applied. Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2014) compared the 
 
3 This measure was modified from Polity scores published by Marshall and Jaggers (2005). This measure 
reflects the dimensions of public participation in political aspects (political rights) including the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment. The scores originally ranged from -10 to 10, with higher 
scores indicating better quality of democratic institutions. 
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OLS and fixed-effects model and found a stable inverse relationship between oil wealth 
per capita, measured using the log of oil per capita and democracy. In this research, 
polity2 was used to measure democracy, which reflected competitiveness and openness 
representing political participation.  
 
While the adverse effects of oil on democracy have become widely accepted, several 
studies have uncovered a surprising contrast result against Ross (2001). Haber and 
Menaldo (2012), for instance, found insignificant results once country fixed-effects were 
controlled. Werger (2009), using fixed-effects regression between 1960 and 2004, found 
that the negative impact of oil production on democracy decreased once the model 
incorporated per capita income and population. Arezki and Bruckner (2011) disclosed that 
a change in oil rents raised civil liberties. Similarly, a study by Brückner (2012) exposed 
that an increase in the share of international oil prices raised democratic institutions. Herb 
(2005) also initially argued that the negative relationship between oil and democracy was 
simply a matter of geographic sampling as previous studies relied heavily on countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa. 
 
Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) conducted an in-depth study that criticized the democracy 
variable used in previous studies (e.g., Jensen & Wanthecekon, 2004; Smith, 2004; Tsui, 
2010). They argued that most studies in the past were focused on the political rights index 
(polity), ignoring civil liberties components, such as freedom of assembly to form 
organizations, and not considering freedom of the press, which can better capture 
democracy dimensions. The studies confirming Ross’s (2001) findings are also limited by 
the time horizon, essential for robustness. Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) then empirically 
tested the hypothesis by proposing an alternative democracy score from Freedom House 
(FH), which included the civil freedom aspect to complement the traditional polity index 
used in the previous studies. To examine temporal stability, Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) 
also employed different periods, comparing the old periods in 1977-1999 and new periods 
within 2000-2006, according to panel data in 132 countries. They found that the 
democracy quality became unaffected by oil when democracy was measured utilizing the 
FH-index, with some surprising positive evidence of oil or mineral dependence (defined 
as the percentage of GDP), when democracy scores referred to political rights and civil 
liberties, respectively. 
 
In addition, Acemoglu et al. (2005) also examined whether democracy performance was 
determined by per capita income, as suggested in another influential study by Barro 
(1999). The authors uncovered that once countries’ unobserved effects were included, 
per capita income became insignificant, but education strongly affected democracy. This 
finding suggests that education should be added as an important control to detect the 
direct influence of oil on the countries’ democracy level. 
 
Reviewing the highlighted literature as above, it is clear that the topic between oil and its 
relationship with democracy is still a developing topic to be studied, and while the existing 
literature has shed some light, many of them were concentrated using cross-country 
datasets. For this reason, this study offered room to fill the gap by adopting in-country 
analysis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, the author could not find similar studies 
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establishing a link between oil or mining dependence and democracy in Asia, nor 
Indonesia.  
 
This paper is then structured as follows: Section 2 explains the author’s data sources, 
including the variable size and the research methods used in this study. Section 3 
demonstrates the results and discusses the relevant findings associated with the purpose 





Since oil export data were not available at the provincial level in Indonesia, the author 
used physical production (lifting) as it closely captured the cross-provincial export level in 
Indonesia. Data on the physical quantity of oil production (in barrels) were obtained from 
the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MoEMR). Oil production in a province was 
the amount of oil produced in all districts of the relevant province, specifically calculating 
oil wells operated onshore or offshore or both in the respective area. Respecting Ross's 
(2001) study, the researcher divided each province’s oil production with the total national 
production to measure it as a share. Again, for robustness check, the researcher also 
divided the province’s oil lifting by its population according to the Indonesian census data 
in 2010, allowing the researcher to measure it as per capita value. 
 
Regarding the democracy variable, the researcher employed the Indonesian Democracy 
Index (IDI) released in 2009 by the Indonesian Central Statistical Bureau (BPS). The IDI 
encompasses three fundamental aspects, namely civil freedom, political rights, and 
democratic institutions. These aspects were then decomposed into 11 variables and 28 
indicators to obtain a single composite index of IDI. This democracy index had a scale of 
0 to 100, where a higher value meant better improvement at the level of democracy. The 
researcher then rescaled this from 0 to 1 to match the scale of this study’s key 
independent variable that used the proportion value. In addition, the researcher limited 
the period to only 2009-2016, following the availability data of IDI. The IDI reflects 
dimensions similar to the well-known FH democracy indicators used by Aslaksen (2010) 
and Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010), which give more weight to political rights and civil 
liberties as the key components.  
 
As in Ross (2001), Aslaksen (2010), and Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010), some control 
variables were also included. The income per capita is hypothesized to increase 
prosperity, thereby improving the demands of democracy. Better educated people are 
expected to increase political representations, enhance public awareness, and improve 
the quality of democracy (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Barro 1999). To measure this, the 
researcher used the human development index (HDI) as a proxy. The researcher was also 
interested in adding variables capturing the dynamics of women’s contributions in each 
province, which were believed to affect democracy sustainability (Gberevbie & Oviasogie, 
2013). For this aim, the researcher utilized the proportion of women involved in formal 
and professional work. The researcher also included internet use as the important control 
variable. Some recent studies have emphasized internet exposure as a driving factor in 
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reinforcing democratic practices (Pirannejad, 2017; Evans, 2019) or reducing people’s 
satisfaction towards democracy (Chang, 2017). Thus, the researcher collected 
information about the percentage of “households” that used the internet in the last three 
months. The researcher was also aware that previous studies had controlled religion to 
capture the proportion of people who embraced Islam. However, based on Indonesia’s 
census in 2010, the majority of the population across provinces in Indonesia were 
affiliated as “Muslims”, while data related to them were unavailable over time. The 
researcher excluded this point as the control of the study. All data used for these 
explanatory variables were also collected from BPS.4 
 
The estimation strategy consisted of two parts. First, considering that the observation 
contained several provinces across different islands, estimation based on the fixed-effects 
(FE) method to control for factors caused by the unobserved heterogeneity in these 
provinces was preferred. The static model was then constructed as follows: 
 
𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
Here, the researcher regressed the quality of democracy (𝐷𝐸𝑀𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡) on this study’s key 
variable, oil dependence or 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡. Democracy was measured by the IDI. The researcher 
also used each component of the IDI, namely civil freedom (CF), political rights (PR), and 
democracy institutions (DI) as mentioned above, as alternative-dependent variables, 
following the strategy used by Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010). 𝑂𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡  is a share of oil 
produced by each province in total oil production and is the share per population as in 
Haber and Menaldo (2011) or Aslaksen (2010).5 
 
The constant provincial fixed effects were indicated by 𝜇𝑖, while 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 was a set of vectors 
indicating the control variables. The subscripts 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3, … … , 33 for 33 provinces across 
all islands in Indonesia, and 𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, … . .8, for the eight years, made the time series 
smaller than the number of the cross-sectional identifier. Given this fact, a more advanced 
static panel model, such as a feasible general least square (FGLS), was not suitable (Reed 
& Ye, 2009). A short period also provided a restriction to effectively perform lagged 
independent variables technique or use a more advanced dynamic panel model. 
 
The estimation that relied on panel data might suffer from a cross-sectional dependency 
problem, resulting in biased estimation. Therefore, the researcher complemented the 
fixed effects model by performing the Driscoll and Kraay (D-K) (1998) standard errors as 
it suited the specification of the data set when 𝑖 > 𝑡. The D-K method, as emphasized in 
Hoechle (2007), was robust in the case of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelated with MA(𝑞), 
and the appearance of a cross-sectional dependent.6 Thus, the researcher followed this 
 
4 The year for HDI and woman participation starts from 2010 onwards. 
5 As summarised in descriptive statistics (see Table 5), the oil dependence measurement contains 0 values. 
This prevents the researcher to transform it into a logarithmic form. Also, as it used the share or proportions 
rather than level, it was infrequent to convert it as logs (see Wooldrige, 2016, p.194-195, for detailed 
explanations). 
6 The PCSE (Panel Corrected Standard Errors) method is also a good alternative and can be done in Stata 
using xtpcse command, but again since the number of observations the researcher used was greater than T, 
the researcher prefered D-K method (Hoecle, 2007). 
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procedure in all estimations. The Pesaran CD test was also used for the first time to detect 
the presence or absence of cross-sectional dependence (De Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006). 
 
Finally, the researcher also tested whether oil lowered democracy performance in 
provinces with higher oil dependence than less or no oil. To do so, the samples were 
separated into two categories. Provinces less dependent on oil were grouped in Java and 
other regions, while oil-rich provinces were grouped in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The 
analysis was then repeated as in Eq. (1) to check whether different results appeared. 
 
 




The researcher began by showing descriptive figures regarding the key variables used, 
while the average comparison was also shown right after. The descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 5. Figure 1 presents scatterplots between the average share of oil 
production and the aggregate index of democracy quality (IDI) over 2009-2016, including 
the three core aspects of IDI. For clarity, the approximate lines in each graph were also 
shown. As shown, there was a positive correlation between oil dependence and IDI, and 
each index related to political rights and democratic institutions in 33 provinces was 
observed. The researcher also found a slight negative pattern on the civil freedom index, 




Figure 1 Relationship between the share of oil production and IDI (2009-2016) 
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Figure 2 compares average oil production between 2009 and 2016, grouped into the 
seven largest islands in Indonesia (Sumatra, Java, Kalimantan, Maluku and the East 
Regions, Sulawesi, and Papua). As predicted, Sumatra became the highest contributor, 
with production stood at 18.4 million barrels. Kalimantan and Java followed with 9.5 
million barrels on average. The remainder regions showed production levels below five 









Figure 3 Comparison of democracy level across Indonesia’s major islands 
 
As shown in Figure 3, comparatively, Sumatra, which produced the highest oil output, did 
not automatically achieve a higher democracy index, while Kalimantan and Java had good 
performance compared to the rest. Interestingly, the oil-poor island of Sulawesi ranked 
fourth place with a better IDI than Sumatra as the oil-rich region. The graph also shows 
that Papua had the lowest democracy index during the observed period. To obtain strong 
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evidence for these revealed descriptive patterns, a regression analysis was conducted to 
formally examine the impact of oil dependence on local democracy indicators in 
Indonesia. 
 
The Effects of Oil on Democracy 
 
Moving on to results, Table 2 presents the effect of oil production’s share on the 
aggregated index of democracy (IDI). All models controlled the provincial fixed effects and 
performed Driscoll Kraay (D-K) standard errors as Pesaran CD tests significantly rejected 
the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence. 
 
In columns (1) - (4), Table 1, it was interestingly found that local democracy was positively 
affected by the share of oil production, where all coefficients were statistically significant 
at a 1 percent level. The point estimates were large in columns (3) and (4) when more 
determinants of democracy were included. Referring to column (4), for example, an 
increase of one percentage point in the share of oil in total production increased IDI by 
0.005 (=0.462*0.01). If the average value of the IDI were 0.685, then the IDI would be 
0.690, and a relative change would increase to (0.690-0.685/0.685=) 0.71 percent. 
Alternatively, by standardizing the coefficient, increasing the share of oil production in 
the total production by one standard deviation would increase IDI by 
([0.088/0.066]*0.462 =) 0.607 standard deviations, holding all others constant.7 
  
The researcher also found that households’ use of the internet and the share of women’s 
participation in professional jobs were positively correlated with democracy level, 
although the magnitudes were small, and the effect of gender was no longer significant, 
as shown in columns (3) - (4). Gini ratio in urban districts also showed negative signs across 
all models as expected but insignificant. As for per capita income, the researcher 
uncovered a positive sign but again not significant in most of the models used. Education, 
in particular, has proven to be a strong determinant of the democracy level in Indonesia, 
where the estimated coefficient was above 1. For example, HDI raised IDI by 
(1.460*0.01=) 0.015 points when HDI increased by one percentage point. 
 
For robustness, the researcher used an alternative measure of oil abundance based on its 
per capita value. All results are depicted in Table 2. Controlling other variables in the 
previous model, the results remained consistent with the positive coefficients found for 
oil per capita, although only significant in columns (3) and (4) but at a 1 percent level. In 
particular, taking column (4) as an example to compare with the result in Table 1, the 
democracy index only improved by (0.642*0.01 =) 0.006 points when oil per capita rose 
by one percentage point. It suggests that even both measures of oil dependence showed 
a positive effect, it was found that the share of oil production had a strong implication on 
the democracy index in the province. Regarding other determinants, it was found that a 
 
7 Standardized coefficients or Beta coefficients measure the standard deviation change in a dependent 
variable caused by a standard deviation increase in an independent variable (Wooldridge, 2016:768). The 
calculation for the Beta coefficient is obtained by multiplying the ?̂?1 with the ratio of standard deviation of 
𝑥1 to the standard deviation of the dependent variable (see Wooldridge, 2016, p.169). 
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similar effect of internet use was positively correlated with democracy, as predicted in 
the literature, whereas HDI remained to increase democracy. 
 
Table 1 The effects of oil production on democracy quality 
Dependent Variable: IDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Share of Oil Production 0.365*** 0.444*** 0.513*** 0.462*** 
 (0.047) (0.064) (0.069) (0.075) 
Income per capita (in logs) 0.037 0.034* 0.009 -0.002 
 (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) 
Gini Ratio  -0.009 -0.175 -0.229 
  (0.157) (0.153) (0.155) 
Woman Participation  0.006*** 0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Internet Use   0.003*** 0.001** 
   (0.001) (0.000) 
HDI    1.460*** 
    (0.340) 
Constant 0.595*** 0.330** 0.595*** -0.267 
 (0.030) (0.089) (0.065) (0.249) 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
D-K Standard Errors YES YES YES YES 
R-squared 0.055 0.112 0.289 0.320 
Observations 264 231 231 231 
Number of groups 33 33 33 33 
Note: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
Table 2 The effects of oil per capita on democracy 
Dependent Variable: IDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Oil Per Capita 0.042 0.026 0.743*** 0.642*** 
 (0.191) (0.112) (0.141) (0.151) 
Income per capita (in logs) 0.004 0.004* 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gini Ratio  0.003 -0.012 -0.018 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Woman Participation  0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet Use   0.0003*** 0.0001** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
HDI    0.151*** 
    (0.033) 
Constant 0.060*** 0.034** 0.057*** -0.031 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.024) 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
D-K Standard Errors YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 0.035 0.085 0.272 0.305 
Observations 264 231 231 231 
Number of groups 33 33 33 33 
Note: *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Moving on to Table 3, the models in Table 1 and Table 2 are replicated and divided into 
two groups: Java & others8 and Sumatra & Kalimantan. The emphasis here is for Sumatra 
and Kalimantan as these islands are known as oil-rich areas. It was rediscovered that 
despite sample separation was conducted, oil dependence was still positively correlated 
with democracy level. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients of oil production share in 
the provinces in the first group were larger than those in Sumatra and Kalimantan.  
 
Table 3 The effects of oil on each aspect of democracy 
Dependent Variable: IDI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Java & other 
regions 






Share of Oil Production 0.426***  0.145*  
 (0.087)  (0.072)  
Oil Per Capita  6.016***  0.325** 
  (0.950)  (0.097) 
Income per capita (in logs) 0.009 0.001 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.012) (0.001) (0.026) (0.003) 
Gini Ratio -0.017 0.005 -0.494** -0.047** 
 (0.174) (0.016) (0.194) (0.019) 
Woman Participation 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Internet Use 0.001 0.000 0.001** 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
HDI 2.048*** 0.202*** 0.736 0.063 
 (0.360) (0.043) (0.460) (0.043) 
Constant -0.728** -0.076** 0.322 0.037 
 (0.243) (0.027) (0.328) (0.031) 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
D-K Standard Errors YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 0.422 0.437 0.242 0.246 
Observations 133 133 97 97 
Number of groups 19 19 14 14 
Note: *, ** and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
The same finding was also found for oil per capita. In particular, for example, holding all 
other factors constant, democracy increased by (0.426*0.01 =) 0.004 points when the 
share of oil production in Java provinces increased by one percentage point, significant at 
a 1 percent level. Meanwhile, it only raised the democracy quality by (0.145*0.01 =) 0.001 
points in provinces located in Sumatra and Kalimantan, with statistically significant only 
at the 10 percent level. The point estimates differed substantially between these two 
groups. For example, a difference of 0.281 for oil production and 5.691 for oil per capita 
was found. These findings suggested that although oil dependence had helped increase 
the overall democracy level, oil impact in oil-deficient provinces or provinces with lack or 
no oil endowments achieved better democracy quality than provinces with dominant oil 
resources. 
 
8 I combine provinces in Java, Maluku and East Regions, NTT, Papua, and Sulawesi in this group. 
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Oil Effects on Particular Aspects of Democracy 
 
Finally, if oil dependence generally helps Indonesia’s democratic environment, does it also 
affect Indonesia's particular aspect of democracy? Table 4 presents the results regarding 
this question by comparing civil freedom, political rights, and democratic institutions, 
where each was placed as the dependent variable, and the researcher regressed them 
separately on the oil measures as before. To save space, attention is now focused on 
estimation associated with the key independent variables.  
 
Table 4 Effects of oil on each aspect of democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables CF PR DI CF PR DI 
Oil Production 0.051*** 0.030* 0.066**    
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.026)    
Oil Per Capita    1.733*** -0.267 0.727 






 (0.026) (0.040) (0.045) (0.017) (0.042) (0.044) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
D-K Standard Errors YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R-Squared 0.078 0.058 0.098 0.113 0.589 0.083 
Observations 231 231 231 231 231 231 
Number of groups 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Note: Civil Freedom (CF), Political Rights (PR) and Democracy Institutions (DI). *, ** and 
*** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
 
As shown, the researcher also exposed consistent results across all specifications within a 
particular dimension in democracy. As measured by its share in total production, oil was 
positively correlated with each dimension, with the indicator in democratic institutions 
being particularly affected. However, different results appeared when oil was measured 
based on a per capita basis. There was no evidence that oil had improved political rights 
and democratic institutions, except for civil freedom. For example, in column (4), 
increasing the value of oil per capita by one percentage point raised the civil freedom 
value by 0.017 points. However, in column (1), using the share of oil production, civil 
freedom only increased by 0.001 points, ceteris paribus. 
 
The finding of this study contradicts Ross’s study, which showed that oil dependence 
positively affected democracy. As democracy measure(s) used reflected indicators 
according to FH dimensions, a positive effect was found on democracy, particularly civil 
liberties. These results align with Arezki and Bruckner’s (2011) and specifically Oskarsson 
and Ottosen’s (2010) studies, emphasizing the FH scores. The researcher followed 
arguments built by Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010), which suggested that the negative 
relationship between oil and democracy found in the previous studies might be caused by 
inadequate measurements to calculate democracy aspects better. For example, once 
indicators capturing civil liberties are better weighted, the oil effect no longer exists or 
fosters democracy. Oskarsson and Ottosen (2010) also highlighted the issues connected 
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to temporal variations, resulting in different consequences once the new periods were 
added. 
 
Another justification of why the findings in this research differed might be due to the 
different scopes observed. Previous studies have repeatedly used cross-country 
explorations, which might not fully control the effects of countries’ heterogeneity. In 
contrast, the within-country approach in this study removed country heterogeneity issues 
while regional differences across provinces could still be controlled by incorporating the 
fixed effects method. 
 
Interesting results were also found, where oil impacts in provinces clustered in Java and 
other regions showed better democratic performance than provinces with a high oil track 
record. As provinces in Java generally have better institutional capacity and infrastructure 
factors, this may exogenously contribute to strengthening local democracy in these areas. 
Furthermore, two factors might contribute to oil production, thereby strengthening 
Indonesia’s democracy. First, as oil generates revenues to provinces and districts, local 
governments may respond in the form of better spending decisions, which could 
strengthen particular aspects of democracy, such as democratic institutions and civil 
awareness. Oil also generates income, which promotes democracy through the 
expansions of the middle class in society (Leonard, 2019). The researcher also uncovered 
that in all the regression models used, education had been a positive contributor to the 
democracy level in Indonesia. 
 
Second, the researcher argued that testing the effects driven by oil wealth on the “quality” 
of democracy should be more relevant in a country that has just transformed to practice 
democratization values. For example, country A and country B both depend on oil as a 
state income source, but country A is recently shifted to adopt a democratic system, say 
a decade ago, while country B remains under their authoritarian political regime. The 
windfalls from oil across regions in country A will be more varied since, in a young 
democratic country, people tend to use this environment to express their political 
aspirations yet raising freedom. In contrast, for country B, as the political regime partly or 
entirely blocks public participation, the magnitude of the oil windfalls seems to create a 





This study assessed the links between oil abundance and democracy using Indonesia as a 
sample of developing countries in Asia. This study contributes to the lack in the number 
of studies addressing this issue specifically to within-country. In this research, the 
provincial fixed effects were used along with Driscoll-Kraay’s robust standard errors to 
deal with arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and cross-section 
dependence in the panel data model. This study also utilized two oil dependence 
measurements, based on production and per capita value, and tested the locational 
effects by dividing the sample. This study also scrutinized whether oil was also mattered 
in particular aspects of Indonesian democracy. 
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The main finding did not confirm the hypothesis, which elaborated that oil rents weaken 
democracy performance. On the other hand, it was found that oil dependence did 
improve Indonesia’s democracy quality, whether measured based on its aggregate index 
value or when democracy was divided based on the index of specific democracy aspects. 
Another finding is that oil was strongly associated with civil liberties in particular, rather 
than with political rights and democratic institutions. Finally, this study uncovered that 
oil’s impact on democracy quality in Java and other regions lacking oil resources was 
stronger than in resource-rich provinces, such as Sumatra and Kalimantan. It might 
suggest that institutional capabilities mattered as it was widely understood that the 
provinces in Java owned better-established government and bureaucracy systems than 
other provinces. 
 
However, this study was limited as it was only conducted at the provincial level, given that 
data on the democracy quality were not available at the district level. This study also did 
not provide wide time intervals due to the availability of data, making it only a short 
observation duration could be analyzed, and this suggested that tests of temporal stability 
had not been sufficiently investigated. Therefore, subsequent research, which 





Table 5 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
IDI 264 0.685353 0.066787 0.5261 0.8558 
Civil Freedom 264 0.08367 0.011645 0.04721 0.1 
Political Rights 264 0.055643 0.012406 0.02895 0.08577 
Democracy Institution 264 0.069916 0.010159 0.0447 0.0935 
Share of Oil Production 264 0.033667 0.088067 0 0.503516 
Oil Per Capita 264 0.001891 0.00464 0 0.027594 
Income per capita (in logs) 264 2.10745 0.758225 0.302138 4.747099 
Gini Ratio 264 0.372144 0.044756 0.259 0.475 
Share of Woman Participation  231 47.05931 5.326302 31.56 59.55 
Internet Use (%) 264 28.87511 14.39659 4.15 76.96 
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